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osovo has raised three 
international debates. Firstly, 
NATO’s decision in March 
1999 to go to war over Kosovo created 
a deep division within the United 
Nations. The second debate was about 
the creation of an international 
administration for Kosovo and the third is now about the future status of the territory. The six ‘just war’ 
principles – a just cause, last resort, likelihood of success, proportionality, right intentions and legitimate 
authority – are traditionally applied to war settings in order to assess the legitimacy of the use of force. They 
can be also used to answer the question of the extent to which the Kosovo conflict can serve as a political 
model for forceful external involvement in a secessionist crisis with severe humanitarian consequences. But 
these six jus ad bellum principles can also be of heuristic value for dealing with the legitimacy of the creation 
of an international administration in Kosovo, and with Kosovo’s right to unilateral secession and its 
recognition by other states.  
1.  Introduction – Three debates 
Kosovo has triggered three international debates. 
First came NATO’s decision in March 1999 to go 
to war over Kosovo. Its military intervention 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1 created 
a deep division within the United Nations Security 
Council (UN SC), where Russia and China refused 
to agree with the other permanent members that the 
forceful displacement of the civilian population of 
Kosovo by the Belgrade authorities amounted to a 
just cause for military intervention. Nor did these 
two states agree that the war could be considered a 
last resort. They argued that the failed negotiations 
between Belgrade and representatives of the 
Kosovo Albanians at Rambouillet had not 
extinguished all hope of finding a peaceful 
outcome to the conflict. The UN SC was further 
divided on whether a war had any likelihood of 
success. Would it succeed in re-establishing 
security and multi-ethnic coexistence in Kosovo?  
                                                 
1 Since 1992, Serbia and Montenegro have constituted 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
The world also debated the question of 
proportionality – whether the moral benefits of the 
war would be higher than its costs. The permanent 
members of the UN SC further accused each other 
of pursuing strategic interests in the region that 
were at odds with the interests of the population of 
Kosovo. These interests meant that policies on 
Kosovo were not actually driven by morally right 
intentions. The question of whether military 
intervention needed UN SC authorisation in order 
to be based on a legitimate authority was also 
crucial in the international debate on NATO’s war 
in Kosovo.  
The second debate was about the creation of an 
international administration for Kosovo. After the 
surrender of Serbia in June 1999, the main 
international actors agreed that the first priority for 
the region was international support for regional 
stability. According to UN SC Resolution 1244 
(1999), Belgrade had no right to exercise its 
authority over the territory of Kosovo, even though 
formally this territory remained part of the Federal 
K 
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Republic of Yugoslavia: a decision on its future 
international status would be taken at a later stage. 
NATO troops – and, up to 2003, also Russian 
troops – were deployed as peacekeepers in Kosovo. 
The formal authority over this region was an 
internationalised body, coordinating the work of 
the UN, NATO, the EU and many other 
international agencies – a form of governance not 
to be found in any other secessionist crisis. 
At the time, the ethical debate on the legitimacy of 
this international administration focused largely on 
the proportionality principle, which weighs up the 
positive and negative consequences of political 
decisions. The reconstruction of Kosovo entailed a 
number of successes and failures. One of the 
positive consequences of the creation of an 
international administration was that Kosovo 
Albanians no longer had to fear being forced out of 
their homes, as had happened to more than 800,000 
of them in 1999.
2 But the military intervention 
leading to its creation had been followed by new 
forms of injustice which the international 
administration was unable to redress or prevent. 
NATO KFOR troops deployed in Kosovo and 
UNMIK international civilian police failed to give 
sufficient protection to its Serb population.
3 The 
first wave of Kosovo Serbs left the region out of 
fear, but many were physically driven out of their 
homes. Ethnically motivated crimes were 
inadequately prosecuted. Kosovo Serbs also left for 
economic reasons: post-war reconstruction did not 
provide the institutional environment needed for 
economic growth. In 2003, some 130,000 of 
Kosovo’s Serbs – roughly two-thirds of its pre-war 
population – were still there, but a great number of 
them remained displaced within Kosovo and unable 
to return to their original homes.
4 The positive and 
negative consequences of the creation of an 
                                                 
2 See International Crisis Group (ICG), “Kosovo: 
Toward Final Status”, Europe Report No. 161, 24 
January 2005, p. 2 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ 
index.cfm?id=3226&l=1). I have made extensive use of 
this report in the present analysis, although the various 
just-war principles referred to here are not used in this 
ICG report. 
3 The inability of KFOR and UNMIK to protect the Serb 
and Gypsy communities was glaringly obvious during 
the riots that erupted in March 2004, where hundreds of 
houses belonging to minorities were destroyed. See 
Human Rights Watch, “Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority 
Violence in Kosovo”, March 2004 
(http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/).  
4 See the “Introduction” to “Failure to Protect”, ibid. 
(http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/3.htm#_Toc77
665973) and International Crisis Group, “Kosovo: No 
Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan”, Europe Report 
No. 182, 14 May 2007, p. 4 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
home/index.cfm?id=4830&l=1).   
international administration were thus substantial, 
and it was difficult to make a clear-cut 
proportionality calculation of its moral costs and 
benefits. 
Where the democratisation of Serbia was 
concerned, Slobodan Milosevic, already weakened 
by his defeat in the war and the loss of Serb control 
over Kosovo, was ousted from power in October 
2000. Regime change in Belgrade paved the way 
for an end to the dispute between Serbia and 
Montenegro, the two constituent entities of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia whose relations 
had been severely strained during Milosevic’s rule. 
It also led to a normalisation of relations with the 
international community. Serbia could even look 
forward to membership of the European Union, on 
the condition that it pursued state reforms. All these 
elements contributed to the stabilisation of the 
Balkan region.  
But the international consensus on UN SC 
Resolution 1999 and the creation of an 
international administration for the territory did not 
mean that there was agreement on how to resolve 
the Kosovo problem. The future status of the 
territory was the subject of the third international 
debate on Kosovo. Western countries favoured 
recognising it as an independent country, whose 
transition to full independence would be supervised 
by the international community. Russia and China 
opposed this option, declaring themselves in favour 
of the present form of international administration. 
At the time of writing, the debate has still failed to 
lead to any decision.  
All three debates on Kosovo had repercussions that 
went far beyond the region itself. The main issues 
concerned the resolution of secessionist conflicts in 
general. The questions at stake were as follows:  
1)  To what extent did the Kosovo conflict set a 
legal precedent, or even provide a political 
model, for forceful external involvement in a 
secessionist crisis with severe humanitarian 
consequences?  
2)  Should secessionist conflicts be solved by 
having the UN or other international 
organisations administer breakaway territories?  
3)  Do the people of a territory who have suffered 
severe injustice have a unilateral right to self-
determination up to the right to independence?  
In the view of the Western countries that were 
involved in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and in 
its international administration, and that have been 
supporting its right to unilateral
5 independence, 
                                                 
5 In the context of this discussion, ‘unilateral’ means that 
the decisions on the use of force or on the international  
Kosovo and the Principles of Just Secession | 3 
these decisions were based on a complex 
constellation of factors, at both the domestic and 
the international levels. They reasoned that 
secessionist conflicts in other parts of the world 
should be regarded as the product of entirely 
different factors, so the set of principles adopted to 
resolve the Kosovo conflict would never constitute 
a legal precedent or political model for resolving 
other secessionist conflicts.  
This line of argument, denying the exemplary 
character of the Kosovo experience, is far from 
convincing, particularly when examined from the 
perspective of political ethics. First, emphasising 
the uniqueness argument in relation to Kosovo 
could lead to an interpretation whereby the 
question of status cannot be decided by universal 
principles but only by ad hoc criteria that are 
created to fit the circumstances of each particular 
situation. This type of argument would make it 
impossible to claim any legitimacy for the 
decisions taken on Kosovo, or even to have a 
rational discussion on the legitimacy of any 
decision concerning a secessionist conflict. 
Secondly, any attempt to resolve a particular 
conflict may become part of a political model for 
discussing how to resolve other conflicts. This does 
not necessarily imply, however, that all secessionist 
crises should be resolved according to the same 
pattern.  
Thirdly, since 1999, in a number of secessionist 
conflicts, Kosovo has already been turned into a 
political model on all three issues mentioned 
above: the use of force in secessionist conflicts, the 
internationalisation of such a conflict and the right 
to unilateral secession. Players draw lessons from 
the Kosovo experience to strengthen their own 
positions in the conflicts they are themselves 
involved in. The first Kosovo model was applied 
by the Georgian government in 1999 in an attempt 
to justify the use of force against Abkhazia, and the 
second by the secessionist Chechen government in 
2003 in an attempt to persuade the international 
community to give Chechnya a UN-led 
administration. The third Kosovo model, on the 
right to secession, is still coming into being in 
2007, pending a decision on this issue.  
2.  Application of ‘just war’ principles 
to the three debates 
There is a body of scholarly literature under the 
heading ‘just war’ principles.
6 These principles – of 
                                                                              
status of the secessionist territory were opposed by the 
central government. 
6 On just war theory, see, among others, Michael 
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with 
a just cause, last resort, likelihood of success, 
proportionality, right intentions and legitimate 
authority – are traditionally applied to war settings 
in order to assess the legitimacy of the use of force 
as an exception to the rule that public authorities 
have to preserve peaceful relations between one 
another and with their citizens. But they can also be 
of heuristic value for dealing with the legitimacy of 
the creation of an international administration, or 
with the right to unilateral secession and its 
recognition by other states. These are exceptions to 
the general rule that the international community 
has to preserve the territorial integrity of states and 
not withdraw part of a territory from the control of 
its central government. The six principles 
mentioned above take on a specific meaning in the 
systematic examination of the justification for such 
exceptions (see Boxes 1, 2 and 3). 
 
Box 1. The Kosovo criteria for military 
intervention in a conflict on sovereignty 
1) A war should have a ‘just cause’. The injustice 
to be prevented or remedied should be serious 
enough to justify the use of military force. In the 
case of a secessionist conflict, the central 
government will often invoke territorial integrity as 
a just cause for the use of force. But the 
secessionist party may likewise invoke the just 
cause principle in defending itself against the 
central government. External players can invoke 
humanitarian reasons, such as genocide or the 
threat of genocide, to justify their right or even 
their duty to intervene using military means. 
2)  The decision should be guided by ‘right 
intentions’. A war about secession should be 
fought primarily for motives consistent with a just 
cause. External military intervention for 
predominantly geo-strategic motives, for instance, 
would be unjust.  
                                                                               
Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic Books, 1992; 
Anthony Joseph Coates, The Ethics of War, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997; Bruno Coppieters 
and Nick Fotion (eds), Moral Constraints on War: 
Principles and  Cases, Lanham,Md: Lexington Books, 
2002. See also “War”, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/). I 
have applied the just war principle to the Georgian-
Abkhaz and the Chechen conflicts in Bruno Coppieters, 
“Secession and War: A Moral Analysis of the Russian-
Chechen Conflict”, in Central Asian Survey, December 
2003, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 377-404 and Bruno Coppieters, 
“War and Secession: A Moral Analysis of the Georgian-
Abkhazian Conflict”, in Bruno Coppieters and Richard 
Sakwa (eds), Contextualizing Secession: Normative 
Studies in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, pp. 187-212.  
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3) Only a ‘legitimate authority’ may launch a war 
to uphold a ‘just cause’. Persons or institutions that 
do not represent the public interest cannot be 
regarded as legitimate authorities when it is being 
decided to resort to force in a secessionist crisis. 
The extent to which the central government or the 
secessionist party may constitute such a legitimate 
authority has to be examined in each particular 
case. The conditions under which the UN SC may 
act as a legitimate authority in deciding on the use 
of force in secessionist conflicts are specified in the 
UN Charter.  
4) A ‘reasonable chance of success’ in upholding 
the ‘just cause’ is a prerequisite for starting 
military operations. In a secessionist crisis, the 
probability of military defeat, or the impossibility 
of redressing or preventing injustice by using force, 
precludes the legitimacy of resorting to military 
means. 
5)  The principle of ‘proportionality’ must be 
respected. The anticipated cost of fighting the war 
for the ‘just cause’ should not be disproportionate 
to the expected benefits. This cost-benefit 
calculation refers to both moral and material 
benefits for the population concerned and for the 
world community at large. 
6)  Violence may be used only as a ‘last resort’. 
Force is the last of the options for remedying or 
preventing injustice in a secessionist crisis. Before 
this step is taken, it must be very clear that all 
efforts to uphold the ‘just cause’ by other means 
have proved fruitless.  
 
These principles are useful for gaining a better 
understanding of the application of the Kosovo 
model to other secessionist conflicts. Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze was the first to 
follow the Kosovo model by calling for military 
intervention against a breakaway state in his own 
country, shortly after NATO’s military intervention 
in 1999. Abkhazia, a territory that had been 
formally part of Georgia before the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, seceded in 1993. This separation 
was the result of a Georgian military defeat. In 
August 1992 the Georgian authorities had 
attempted to resolve an ethnic conflict in Abkhazia, 
between their community and the Abkhaz, by using 
military force. But North Caucasus volunteers and 
Russian troops sided with the Abkhaz, leading to 
the defeat of the Georgian troops and the flight of 
nearly the entire Georgian population from the 
territory. Russia deployed troops to separate the 
conflicting parties, with UN peacekeepers in a 
monitoring role. The UN was given the further role 
of mediating between the parties. The UN regarded 
Abkhazia as part of Georgia, and was striving for a 
federal solution based on the principle of territorial 
integrity, but the negotiations on the reunification 
of the territory with Georgia produced no concrete 
results. All Georgian appeals to the UN SC for 
forceful international intervention to crush de facto 
Abkhaz statehood were in vain, mainly owing to 
Russian opposition to any move in that direction. 
Only a minority of the Georgian population 
expelled from Abkhazia were able to return to their 
homes. 
The Kosovo war then showed that it was possible 
for Western states to intervene forcefully in a 
secessionist crisis. In Shevardnadze’s view, the 
ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population from 
Abkhazia constituted a just cause for intervention, 
as had been the case in Kosovo.
7 For 
Shevardnadze, the fact that NATO had intervened 
in support of a population that wanted to secede 
and create an independent state was secondary. 
More important was the idea that the use of 
military force remains the most effective 
instrument for ending the contest of wills in a 
secessionist conflict. The lesson the Georgian 
President was drawing from Kosovo was thus 
presented as an alternative to a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict over Abkhazia. But there were no 
strong arguments to bring this alternative option 
into line with the last resort principle. This option 
was also in breach of other just war principles. 
Shevardnadze himself conceded that, contrary to 
what had happened in Kosovo, here the use of force 
would require the full consent of the UN SC. 
Without Russian support, such intervention would 
create a new international conflict, which NATO 
members were unwilling to engage in. This meant 
that the application of the Kosovo model to 
Abkhazia was not in line with the legitimate 
authority and likelihood of success principles. For 
all these reasons, NATO countries have never taken 
seriously the suggestion to apply this Kosovo 
model to Georgia. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Floriana Fossato, “Georgia: President Supports 
NATO Air Campaign; Draws Parallels With Abkhazia”, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, News & Analysis, 11 
May 1999 (http://www.rferl.org/features/1999/05/ 
f.ru.990511133219.asp). On the positions of Georgian 
officials on how the Kosovo example should be 
followed by Georgia, see also Grigory Alexeyev, “CIS 
states claim new Savior – NATO”, The Russia Journal, 
30 August 1999 
(http://www.cdi.org/russia/sep0399.html). See also “The 
Army and Society in Georgia’, December 1999, p. 9 
(http://www.cpirs.org.ge/Archive/AS_12_99.pdf).  
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Box 2. The Kosovo criteria for an international 
administration for a breakaway territory 
1) In order to prevent injustice in secessionist 
conflicts, the creation of an international 
administration for a breakaway territory should 
have a specific ‘just cause’. Attempts to secede 
may be either illegitimate or legitimate. In the first 
case, an international administration may be 
helpful for guaranteeing a transition towards the 
reunification of a country in accordance with the 
principle of territorial integrity. In the second case, 
an international administration aims to redress or 
prevent serious injustice, such as genocide or other 
forms of severe oppression, perpetrated by a 
central government.  
2) The creation of an international administration 
should be guided by ‘right intentions’ that are 
consistent with a just cause, and not by the 
particular geopolitical interests of certain outside 
powers.  
3) Only a ‘legitimate authority’ may create such an 
international administration for a breakaway 
territory. It may be agreed with the central 
government, or imposed by the UN SC. The 
European Union does not in itself have the legal 
authority to create such an administration. It may 
be involved in one, however, on the basis of an 
authorisation from the central government or the 
UN SC. 
4) A ‘reasonable chance of success’ in upholding 
the ‘just cause’ is a prerequisite for such an option. 
The ineffectiveness of an international 
administration in overcoming the secessionist crisis 
through either reunification or independence would 
go against this option. The non-sustainability of the 
new institutions or the inability of the 
administration to prevent an escalation of the 
violent conflict would negate the legitimacy of 
such an arrangement.  
5) The principle of ‘proportionality’ must take into 
account the anticipated benefits, which refer to the 
correction or the prevention of injustice, and the 
costs. The external imposition of an international 
administration on the central government or on the 
population of the breakaway territory may 
negatively affect the self-sustainability of state 
institutions and the principle of democratic 
representation. 
6) The creation of an international administration 
against the wishes of one (or both) of the parties 
has to be a ‘last resort’ solution for remedying or 
preventing injustice, in cases where consensual 
alternatives respecting the principle of the 
territorial integrity of states cannot be found. 
 
NATO’s war on Kosovo ended in June 1999. Just a 
few months later, in August, the Russian 
government under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin decided to enforce a military 
solution in Chechnya, a territory in the Northern 
Caucasus that was under the control of secessionist 
forces. The Chechen forces suffered a decisive 
military defeat, and had to confine themselves to 
isolated acts of military resistance. In numerous 
cases, Chechen fighters even resorted to terrorist 
acts. 
In 2003, the pro-independence Chechen 
government came up with its own interpretation of 
the Kosovo model. Its plan for ‘supervised 
independence’ for Chechnya was based explicitly 
on the Kosovo experience.
8 UN SC Resolution 
1244 was the main reference in the appeal to the 
international community to give this war-torn 
territory an international administration.  
The Chechen government argued that the 
correction and prevention of injustice required full 
sovereignty and independence. Chechnya was in 
principle considered to have a unilateral right to 
secede from the Russian Federation, but the 
Chechen authorities agreed that the UN SC would 
play a crucial role in the supervision and final 
recognition of independence. Chechnya would be 
given a UN-appointed administration to prepare the 
ground for democratic state reform and, ultimately, 
Chechen independence. The principle of legitimate 
authority was central to this idea.  
The plan received support in some political circles, 
particularly among members of the European 
Parliament, but it never became part of the 
negotiations on a solution for Chechnya. Russia 
would never support the deployment of UN troops 
to secure its own national borders. The plan, 
therefore, had no real likelihood of success. 
 
Box 3. The Kosovo model for unilateral 
independence 
1)  Secession should have a ‘just cause’. This 
means that the injustice to be prevented or 
remedied should be severe enough to justify a 
unilateral declaration of independence, and the 
recognition of a new independent state by the UN 
SC and the international community against the 
will of the central government, or its partial 
recognition.  
                                                 
8 The plan was entitled “The Russian-Chechen Tragedy: 
The Way to Peace and Democracy” and published in 
February 2003 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (http://www.chechnya-
mfa.info/paper/en_text.pdf).  
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2) A unilateral declaration of independence and its 
recognition should have a ‘reasonable chance of 
success’ in achieving its aims. These are threefold. 
First, the declaration and/or unilateral recognition 
of independence are unjustified if there is no 
reasonable chance of translating the just cause into 
reality. Secondly, there should be a reasonable 
chance of having the new state recognised in the 
long run by a substantial section of the 
international community. Thirdly, a declaration or 
recognition of independence is unjustified if it does 
not result in new state institutions that are 
sustainable.  
3) A unilateral declaration of secession and/or its 
recognition can only be a ‘last resort’ solution. 
Before resorting to such a decision, it should be 
reasonably clear that all other options – including 
minority rights, autonomy and federalism – are 
powerless to remedy or to prevent injustice and 
that it is impossible to obtain the central 
government’s agreement to the creation of the new 
independent state. 
4) A unilateral declaration of independence has to 
be made or recognised through a ‘legitimate 
authority’. This principle has two different 
meanings in this particular context. First, it refers 
to the legitimate authority of the secessionist 
movement. This should represent the entire 
population of the seceding territory. It should be 
able to enforce legislation over the whole territory 
and to act with respect for international human 
rights and minority rights. The need for a distinct 
and clearly identifiable national identity, and for a 
majority (perhaps even a special majority) of 
referendum votes in favour of independence, may 
also be approached from the principle of 
‘legitimate authority’. Secondly, it refers to the 
process of recognising a state through a legitimate 
authority on the international scene. This generally 
means entry into the UN. 
5)  The principle of ‘proportionality’ should be 
respected. The anticipated costs and benefits 
should be calculated at both the domestic and the 
international levels. 
6)  The decision to seize independence or to 
recognise a state that has seceded unilaterally 
should be guided by ‘right intentions’. This means 
that the unilateral declaration or recognition of its 
independence – either by the UN SC or unilaterally 
by some states – should be motivated primarily by 
considerations consistent with the just cause for 
independence.  
3.  Testing options for Kosovo with the 
‘just war’ principles 
In 2007, it seems that five options are being 
envisaged for the future status of Kosovo (see Box 
4). With the exception of the first one, they are 
based on the assessment that Kosovo has a just 
cause for independence. 
Box 4. Five options in the negotiations on the 
status of Kosovo 
1) An agreement between Belgrade and Pristina 
on autonomous status.  
2) An agreement between Belgrade and Pristina 
on independence for Kosovo.  
3) An agreement within the UN SC on 
supervised independence for Kosovo, paving the 
way for full implementation of the Ahtisaari 
plan. 
4) A decision on the question of sovereignty and 
independence is put on hold, pending a 
resolution by the UN SC on supervised 
independence. This option may include a reform 
of Kosovo’s state structures with the consent of 
the UN SC. 
5) Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence is partially recognised. 
Each of these options needs to be examined further 
in the light of the ‘just secession’ principles – of 
just cause, likelihood of success, last resort, 
legitimate authority, proportionality and right 
intentions. 
A just cause for independence? 
The international authority established by the UN 
for Kosovo ruled out the exercise of state authority 
over this territory by Belgrade, pending a decision 
on its final status. The Western states who 
supported this SC resolution in 1999 were strongly 
motivated by a just cause argument. In their view, 
the Serb state was responsible for the massive 
violation of human rights in the 1998-1999 period. 
An international administration would prevent the 
Kosovo Albanians from being in such a situation 
again. The same just cause argument in favour of 
the establishment of a provisional international 
authority over Kosovo was then used to justify the 
definitive loss of sovereignty over this territory by 
Serbia. 
The Serb government, for its part, likewise argues 
from the just cause perspective. It considers that the 
secession of Kosovo would violate its sovereignty 
and the principle of territorial integrity. It has 
strong historical ties to the region. From the Serb 
point of view, the independence of Kosovo would 
be a direct threat to the rights of the Serbian  
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minority of this territory. Belgrade does not accept 
the argument that the past crimes of Slobodan 
Milosevic justify the future independence of 
Kosovo, maintaining instead that the democratic 
Serbia that emerged from the overthrow of the 
Milosevic regime in October 2000 would give 
sufficient guarantees to prevent such injustice from 
ever being repeated again. 
It may be concluded that the massive scale of the 
human rights violations created a just cause for 
Kosovo’s independence, aside from the principle of 
territorial integrity. The injustice was so severe that 
it has delegitimised Serbia’s sovereign rights over 
the territory to which this principle of territorial 
integrity is tied.  
Does independence have a likelihood of 
success? 
The first option would give Kosovo autonomy 
within Serbia, while the four remaining options aim 
at its independence. What are their chances of 
success, with respect to 1) upholding the just cause, 
2) achieving independence and 3) creating 
sustainable state institutions?  
Where the first option is concerned, the Serb 
government argues that the war crimes committed 
against the Kosovo Albanians cannot be repeated in 
a democratic Serbia. Constitutional guarantees, 
they say, would be given to the Kosovo Albanians 
in the form of broad autonomy for Kosovo.  
The likelihood of success of the autonomy option 
in preventing fresh injustice would be strengthened 
by European integration. Serbia has a reasonable 
long-term chance of becoming fully integrated 
within the European Union, and such integration is 
generally considered to have positive consequences 
on conflict resolution.
9 State reform in line with 
European democratic and legal standards would 
strengthen the guarantees for Kosovo Albanians. 
Integration within the EU, in particular, will 
increase the likelihood of shared sovereignty within 
a federal framework. The transfer of power from 
Serbia and from Kosovo to the European level of 
governance will decrease the points of friction 
between the communities and the significance of 
international boundaries. The Europeanisation of 
                                                 
9 On the consequences of European integration for 
secessionist conflicts at the European periphery see 
Bruno Coppieters et al., Europeanization and Conflict 
Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery, 
published in 2004 as a special issue of the Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1/2004 
(http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/). Also published as a book 
by Academia Press, Ghent, 2004. 
Serbia is an additional argument in favour of 
autonomy for Kosovo. 
Those who do not believe that autonomy can 
succeed in preventing fresh injustice against the 
Kosovo Albanians argue that the present 
constitution provides only limited forms of self-
governance for the autonomous provinces, 
including Kosovo (Articles 182-187). They can 
regulate “matters of provincial interest” in 
accordance with Serbian law, but it keeps them 
under the close supervision of the central 
government and the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Serbia.
10  
Serbia agrees to looser links between Belgrade and 
Pristina than those stipulated in the present 
constitution. The autonomous status of Hong Kong 
within the People’s Republic of China has been 
mentioned by Serb negotiators as a suitable 
model,
11 but there is no guarantee that such an 
autonomous status would be sustainable. Serbia has 
undergone thorough democratic reform, but it does 
not enjoy sufficient political stability or multi-
ethnic tolerance to secure autonomy for Kosovo or 
power-sharing between the Serb majority and the 
Kosovo-Albanian minority at central state level.
12 
For these reasons, the Kosovo Albanians do not 
feel that Serbia has become more trustworthy since 
the overthrow of the Milosevic regime. They are 
therefore unwilling to enter into negotiations on 
alternatives to independence.  
In the previous section, we concluded that the 
severity of the injustice suffered by the Kosovo 
Albanians before NATO’s intervention in 1999 
justified independence from the perspective of a 
just cause. Independence can also be justified from 
the perspective of the likelihood of success 
principle. Autonomy within Serbia and other 
federal alternatives do not offer sufficient security 
guarantees to the Kosovo Albanians.  
The four remaining options being discussed in 
2007 in the international debate on Kosovo all aim 
at independence. The likelihood of success of this 
perspective is strengthened by the reasonable 
expectation that Kosovo’s independence will be 
recognised by a substantial part – and in the long 
run, even the whole – of the international 
community. This is mainly thanks to Western 
support. To gain acceptance from the international 
community is difficult, but the combined 
diplomatic leverage of the United States and the 
                                                 
10 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 
(http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/eng/akta/ustav/
ustav_1.asp). 
11 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 November 2007. 
12 “Kosovo: Toward Final Status”, op. cit., p. 15.  
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European Union gives Kosovo far greater 
diplomatic support than that enjoyed by any other 
breakaway state.
13  
Each of these four remaining options aims at 
achieving Kosovo’s independence through different 
means. Their likelihood of success in achieving 
recognition has to be assessed separately. The 
second option – Serb consent to Kosovo’s 
independence – is not likely. Kosovo is crucial to 
Serb national identity. The government’s hands are 
tied by a Constitution that considers Serbian 
territory “inseparable and indivisible” (Article 8). 
The Serb Constitution (Article 114) further 
prescribes that the Serbian president has to swear 
that he will devote all his efforts to preserving “the 
sovereignty and integrity of the territory of the 
Republic of Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija 
as its constituent part”. 
The European Union and the United States had 
expected Serbia, which had put great faith in its 
expectation of membership of the European Union, 
to cave in to their diplomatic pressure. This 
pressure, however, was not sufficient to persuade 
the main political parties to give up Serbian rights 
over Kosovo.  
It has often been asserted that Serb consent to 
independence could be achieved by making far-
reaching concessions, such as territorial 
adjustments to the advantage of Serbia. For 
example, Serbian-populated Northern Kosovo 
could be attached to Serbia. At first, this kind of 
partition was deemed unacceptable by Western 
governments. The creation of ethnically 
homogeneous territories would be in breach of the 
principle of multi-ethnic co-existence, and 
undermining this principle would constitute a threat 
to the multinational Bosnian federation and the 
multinational Macedonian state.
14 But in the face of 
Serb and Russian intransigence, Western diplomats 
have softened their position on that question – 
without, however, being able to break the deadlock 
in the negotiations.  
The second option thus fulfils the likelihood of 
success principle defined as the successful 
upholding of a just cause, but it does not fulfil the 
                                                 
13 Turkey remained diplomatically isolated when it 
recognised the independence of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. Russia would 
likewise be unable to gain a significant following in the 
international community if it were to recognise the 
unilateral declarations of independence made by 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. This lack of 
likelihood of success largely explains why the Russian 
government has so far refrained from granting such 
recognition.  
14 “Kosovo: No Good Alternatives”, op. cit., pp. 10-15. 
same principle when it is defined as the likelihood 
of achieving independence. It could be added here 
that this option would again be in accordance with 
the same principle when defined as the creation of 
sustainable state institutions. 
A third option would be a unilateral decision taken 
by the UN SC – against the will of Serbia – on 
independence for Kosovo under international 
supervision. In March 2007, the UN Secretary-
General presented a “Report” and a 
“Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement” to the UN SC. Both documents had 
been prepared by his special envoy, Martti 
Ahtisaari.
15 After abandoning all hope of reaching 
agreement between the parties, he pleaded in 
favour of a decision by the UN SC in support of 
supervised independence. Ahtisaari received 
support from Western countries, but Russia and 
China remained firm in their refusal to accept a UN 
SC proposal that would run counter to the Serb 
position on territorial integrity.
16  
Since 2006 the UN mediation process has had to be 
extended repeatedly in order to broaden 
international support for an agreement. Each 
postponement has been coupled with the setting of 
new deadlines, with still no breakthrough in the 
negotiations. But a compromise between the 
permanent members of the UN SC cannot 
reasonably be ruled out. It may thus be concluded 
that the third option fulfils the likelihood of success 
principle as far as the implementation of just cause 
is concerned, and as a reasonable strategy for 
achieving independence, despite the immense 
difficulties confronting international diplomacy.  
Furthermore, it would meet the same likelihood of 
success criterion with respect to the creation of 
sustainable institutions. A UN SC resolution in 
favour of supervised independence would create 
the necessary legal framework for efficient 
governance in Kosovo. Expressing a view widely 
shared among Western diplomats, Ahtisaari stated 
                                                 
15 Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council. 
Addendum. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement, UN Security Council, 
S/2007/168/Add.1 (http://www.unosek.org/unosek/ 
index.html). This document includes the Report and the 
Comprehensive Proposal. The concept of independence 
is mentioned in the former but not in the latter – a 
difference that is important in the search for 
international diplomatic support for the ideas present in 
both documents. See ICG, “Kosovo: No Good 
Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan”, No. 17, p. 3. 
16 On Russia’s position, see Oksana Antonenko, “Russia 
and the Deadlock over Kosovo”, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 
3, pp. 91-106.  
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that “economic development in Kosovo requires 
the clarity and stability that only independence can 
provide”.
17  
A fourth option available is to put the decision on 
hold, at least where sovereignty and independence 
are concerned. This option would give Western 
powers more time to persuade Russia and China 
not to oppose a SC resolution in favour of 
supervised independence. But even though this 
option fulfils the likelihood of success principle in 
terms of just cause and as a strategy for 
independence, it creates a series of sustainability 
problems of its own. A lengthening of the decision-
making process could lead radical Kosovo 
Albanians to resort to force. Violent riots have 
already taken place (in March 2004), directed 
against the Serbian population of Kosovo. 
Hundreds of citizens belonging to the Kosovo 
minorities were injured in mobilisations across the 
territory that involved more than 50,000 people.
18 
A repetition of such events could necessitate the 
use of force by the local police and by NATO’s 
KFOR troops, but without any guarantee that this 
would stabilise the situation. An escalation of 
violence would entail the risk of a spill-over into 
other Balkan states, including neighbouring 
Macedonia and Bosnia. But not all international 
actors appear to be worried by this eventuality. 
Russian diplomats did not seem particularly 
impressed by this argument against postponing a 
UN decision on final status.
19  
There are also substantial legal and economic 
arguments against postponement. As the 
clarification of the final legal status of Kosovo is 
intended to enable large-scale economic aid and 
investment to flow in from abroad, any delay 
makes economic recovery more difficult, 
particularly in a situation where economic 
indicators are worsening.
20 For these reasons, the 
option of leaving Kosovo in a legal and political 
limbo for an indefinite period has encountered 
strong opposition from Western states, and 
postponement would not meet the likelihood of 
success principle in its specific meaning of the 
creation of sustainable institutions. 
                                                 
17 “Report of the Special Envoy”, op. cit., p. 3. 
18 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News, Kosovo: 
“Criminal Justice System Fails Victims”, 30 May 2006 
(http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/05/30/serbia13441.ht
m). See also Human Rights Watch, “Not on the Agenda: 
The Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in 
Kosovo Post-March 2004”, 30 May 2006 
(http://hrw.org/reports/2006/kosovo0506/).  
19 “Kosovo: No Good Alternatives”, op. cit., p. 6. 
20 “Kosovo: Toward Final Status”, op. cit., p. 1, 5. 
To address this problem it has been proposed that 
Serbia and Kosovo should regulate their relations, 
except on the question of sovereignty. Under these 
conditions, state reforms in Kosovo could proceed, 
but the questions of sovereignty and independence 
would remain to be decided in the future.
21  
The fifth alternative is a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Kosovo and its recognition by 
major countries.
22 The US and a number of 
European states could take such a step towards 
partial recognition in the expectation that other 
states would follow suit. Such an option would turn 
independence into an irreversible option, and thus 
fulfil the likelihood of success principle in that 
particular respect. Such a strategy may, however, 
require a good deal of time, particularly if the EU 
member states are not unanimous in their attitude. 
This option would also fulfil the likelihood of 
success principle defined as the creation of 
sustainable institutions, even if the main measures 
proposed by Special Envoy Ahtisaari would have 
to be implemented without the legal basis provided 
by authorisation from the SC.  
Is independence a last resort option? 
The first two options are based on an agreement 
between the conflicting parties, so the question of 
independence as a last resort does not arise. The 
Western governments, faced with Russia’s 
opposition to the third option of a UN SC decision 
on supervised independence, have already moved 
to discuss a choice between the fourth and fifth 
options. Those who oppose the fifth option – partial 
recognition of a unilateral declaration of 
independence – stress that the third option of a UN 
SC decision still remains on the table and that the 
fourth – to put the decision on hold – still leaves 
some room for seeking agreement at the 
international level. This is excluded in the fifth 
option. It may therefore be concluded that the third 
and fourth options are in line with the last resort 
principle, but the fifth is not.  
Is independence based on a legitimate 
authority? 
In a just secession analysis, the principle of 
legitimate authority refers first of all to the 
legitimacy of the process of recognising 
independence and secondly to the legitimacy of the 
new state institutions that are to be created within 
                                                 
21 Der Tagesspiegel, 5 November 2007. 
22 This option is analyzed in depth in International Crisis 
Group, “Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s 
Responsibility”, Europe Report No 185, 21 August 2007 
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm).  
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the framework of supervised independence. The 
latter involves assessing their sustainability, 
representativeness and respect for minority rights.  
The Kosovar institutions that came into being after 
the 1999 war were weak and incapable of taking on 
the responsibilities normally assumed by state 
authorities. The failure to integrate the Serbs and 
other minorities, opposition to the return of Serb 
refugees, lack of qualified personnel and 
widespread corruption were among the main 
problems found in the post-1999 context.
23 The 
principle of ‘standards before status’, adopted by 
the UN in 2002, was intended to create democratic 
institutions based on the rule of law. State reforms 
preceded the present international discussion on the 
supervised independence of Kosovo, as a necessary 
condition. 
Ahtisaari’s “Comprehensive Proposal” of 2007 
contains a list of general principles, such as the aim 
of creating a multi-ethnic society with Albanian 
and Serbian as official languages, respect “for the 
highest level of internationally recognised human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the 
promotion and protection of the rights and 
contributions of all its Communities and their 
members”. It further rules out unification with 
Albania and, as part of the supervised nature of 
Kosovar independence, sets up a comprehensive 
international framework to “supervise, monitor and 
have all necessary powers to ensure effective and 
efficient implementation of this Settlement”. The 
decentralisation of state power to the municipal 
authorities is designed to strengthen the multi-
ethnic character of self-governance.  
The active involvement of the EU, the appointment 
of an International Civilian Representative with 
wide powers, and an international military 
presence, all constitute strong guarantees that 
human rights and democratic standards will be 
upheld in the new state, particularly with respect to 
its minorities – or rather, the non-Albanian 
‘communities’, as called in the UN proposal. 
Unlike the autonomous institutions to be created 
for the Kosovo Albanians within Serbia under the 
first option, the Ahtisaari plan gives broad 
guarantees of the sustainability, representativeness 
and respect for minority rights of the state 
institutions. In principle, the last four of the five 
options mentioned above could address these 
issues, but only the second (through Serb consent) 
and the third (through a UN SC resolution) would 
implement the Ahtisaari plan in full. Both options 
would thus meet the legitimate authority principle 
in its two different meanings: as regards the 
                                                 
23 “Kosovo: Toward Final Status”, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
legitimacy both of the process of recognition and of 
the creation of state institutions.  
In the fourth option, the suspension of the 
sovereignty issue would, at best, be linked in the 
short term to a new resolution by the UN SC to 
proceed with further state reforms in Kosovo. This 
could then include a partial implementation of the 
Ahtisaari plan. But even if this did not happen, the 
state institutions would still be regarded as 
legitimate, being based on the present UN SC 
resolution on the creation of an international 
administration. Where the legitimate authority 
principle in relation to the process of recognition is 
concerned, this option is based on the assumption 
that in the future an agreement can be found within 
the UN SC. It is thus in accordance with both 
meanings of the legitimate authority principle.  
The fifth option, on the contrary, should be seen as 
not being in line with the legitimate authority 
principle in its first meaning, as it refers to partial 
recognition, ruling out acceptance by the Serb 
central government and the UN SC as a whole. Full 
legitimacy would be lacking even if Kosovo were 
to be recognised by a substantial part of the 
international community. Furthermore, lack of UN 
supervision of the process leading to independence 
would create serious legal problems for the EU in 
its reconstruction and state-building efforts. But 
this would not necessarily make them less 
legitimate in terms of their representativeness or 
respect for minority rights. The fifth option is thus 
in accordance with the legitimate authority 
principle in its second meaning.  
Is independence in accordance with the 
proportionality principle? 
The moral costs and benefits of each of the five 
status options have to be calculated at both the 
domestic and the international levels. Where 
autonomy is concerned, with the first option the 
costs would be higher than the benefits at both 
levels, as autonomy would probably not prevent 
renewed domestic conflicts with international 
implications. Where the four other options are 
concerned, one potential benefit of independence 
could be to lift Kosovo out of the legal limbo to 
which it has been relegated since the military 
intervention in 1999. The consequences for the 
non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo – primarily the 
Serb population that has not left the territory – also 
have to be assessed. International monitoring and 
control of the new state would give strong 
guarantees of minority protection in Kosovo. But it 
must also be acknowledged that the presence of 
international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo in the 
post-war period was not sufficient to secure the 
rights of the Serb minority, who fled the region in  
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great numbers. At the international level, the first 
concern would be the potentially destabilising 
repercussions on other conflicts. 
The costs and benefits would be in direct 
proportion to the type of outcome and the degree of 
international legitimacy this modus of supervised 
independence received in the various options in 
favour of independence. An agreement between the 
two parties on independence for Kosovo, in line 
with the second option, would in my view result in 
a positive proportionality calculation at both the 
domestic and international levels.  
Despite being based on an endorsement by the UN 
SC, the third option would have significant 
negative consequences for the mediation of other 
conflicts. The establishment of a legal framework 
for supervised independence in the non-colonial 
world would constitute a novelty in secessionist 
conflicts. International security organisations such 
as the UN and the OSCE (Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe) have traditionally 
regarded the application of federal and other 
power-sharing techniques as the best approach to 
resolve violent ethnic conflicts and achieve re-
unification of divided states and nations. After 
Kosovo, it will be more difficult to convince the 
leaders and populations of breakaway territories 
that there are viable last-resort alternatives to full 
sovereignty.  
The fourth option – to postpone the status issue – 
could have substantial negative consequences for 
domestic security, and the fifth for international 
security. A split in the international community 
over the recognition of a new state, following the 
fifth option, would be detrimental to resolution of 
other secessionist conflicts. 
Russia points out the importance of envisaging all 
the potential repercussions on international security 
of a unilateral Western decision on Kosovo. In its 
view, any decision has to be consistent with the 
management of other secessionist conflicts in 
Europe. Unilateral steps by the Western states 
leading to a recognition of Kosovo’s independence 
could very well be followed by unilateral steps (not 
necessarily involving the recognition of their 
independence) on the part of the Russian 
government concerning Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transnistria. 
Unilateral recognition of a Kosovar declaration of 
independence would not only set Russia and China 
against the US, but would also create dividing lines 
within the EU. In one way or another, Spain, 
Slovakia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary and Romania 
are all confronted with secessionist conflicts. The 
remaining EU members would have the greatest 
difficulty in convincing them that recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence without the endorsement 
of the UN SC does not affect their own interests.  
Chinese observers are concerned that a unilateral 
declaration of independence by Kosovo and its 
subsequent recognition by the US and other 
Western states would create a model for Taiwan. 
Radical currents within the Taiwanese pro-
independence movement might feel strengthened in 
their resolve to put a question related to sovereignty 
to referendum, in the hope that this might in the 
long run be recognised by the international 
community. Such a move would inevitably provoke 
a severe crisis in cross-Strait relations.  
Are the motives for independence based 
on right intentions? 
There is no reason to believe that the true intentions 
of the Serb or Kosovar authorities diverge from 
their justification of their respective positions on 
secession. They both defend ideological positions 
that are in line with their views on nationhood and 
on their legitimate interest in a just world order. 
The Kosovo Albanian authorities are convinced 
that refusing them independence would constitute a 
severe injustice, while the Serb government argues 
that breaching the territorial integrity of its state 
would be unjust. Other motives undoubtedly exist, 
but they are of secondary importance in this 
respect. As far as the right intentions principle is 
concerned, both parties are thus defending what 
they subjectively regard as a just cause.  
The positions of the external actors are more 
complex. Western governments, in particular the 
European Union, are directly involved in the 
management of Kosovo’s affairs, and will thus be 
far more concerned about the consequences of any 
status decision for stability in Kosovo itself than 
either Russia or China, which do not have to carry 
the burden of the non-resolution of this conflict. 
Some EU members are likewise fearful of the 
indirect consequences of the option of partial 
recognition of Kosovo for secessionist conflicts 
within their own territory (Spain and Cyprus) or on 
the territory of one of their allies (Greek concerns 
about Cyprus). Russia has similar concerns in 
relation to the North Caucasus, but in a Western 
unilateral decision it also sees certain opportunities 
for strengthening its position on Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Transnistria. Despite these very 
different interests and perspectives, however, all 
the external parties – including Russia – are 
primarily defending a position that they 
subjectively consider to be in line with their view 
of nationhood and just cause. In this respect, the 
just intentions principle is respected in all the 
positions that have been taken concerning the 
future status of Kosovo.   
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4.  A Difficult Choice 
In March 2007, Martti Ahtisaari argued in his 
proposal that Kosovo constituted “a unique case” 
which required “a unique solution”.
24 The case of 
Kosovo is indeed unique in many respects, 
including the circumstances of the conflict, but the 
option of supervised independence for the territory 
nonetheless remains based on a number of 
principles that have universal value. Because of 
this, it has already been possible to apply two 
‘Kosovo models’ – one on the use of force in a 
secessionist conflict and one on the creation of an 
international administration for breakaway 
territories – in discussions on secessionist conflicts 
in Abkhazia and Chechnya. These applications, 
however, were not convincing, but it is very 
probable that the ‘Kosovo model’ on unilateral 
independence will have a greater impact in 
conflicts on sovereignty.  
Serbia’s loss of control over Kosovo can be 
justified by the just cause argument. Supervised 
independence is the only means of guaranteeing the 
correction and prevention of severe injustice.  
Where the principle of the likelihood of success is 
concerned, in choosing Kosovo’s future status a 
distinction has to be drawn between five different 
options: 1) autonomy, 2) independence with the 
agreement of Serbia, 3) supervised independence 
under the authority of the UN SC, 4) postponement 
of the final decision on independence in the 
expectation that this will be decided consensually 
within the UN SC at a later stage and 5) unilateral 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence by a number 
of states.  
The likelihood of success principle has three 
different meanings. Only the four options in favour 
of independence meet the principle in its first 
meaning, as the successful upholding of a just 
cause. Where the second meaning is concerned – 
the successful recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence by the international community – 
Kosovo is a singular case among secessionist 
conflicts owing to the widespread support among 
Western governments for the idea of its supervised 
independence. This has created the reasonable hope 
that Russia and China may in the long term have to 
agree to this option. This expectation is assumed in 
the third, fourth and fifth options. The second, third 
and fifth options follow the principle in its third 
meaning, the creation of sustainable state 
institutions. In this respect, the potential risks 
implied in the fourth option are too great to be 
considered in line with this principle. 
                                                 
24 Letter dated 26 March 2007, p. 4.  
The option of a UN SC resolution in favour of 
conditional independence (option 3) and the option 
to put the question of independence on hold (option 
4) are the only ones in line with the last resort 
principle. This criterion is not applicable to the 
option of achieving independence on the basis of an 
agreement between the parties (option 2). The same 
options (2, 3 and 4) are in line with the principle of 
a legitimate authority, understood as a legitimate 
process for achieving recognition. Where the 
creation of legitimate state institutions is 
concerned, all options with the exception of the 
first (autonomy) are in line with the legitimate 
authority principle. 
The proportionality balance between the moral 
costs and benefits of supervised independence has 
to be calculated separately at the domestic and 
international levels. Where the former is concerned, 
the rights of the non-Albanian communities in 
Kosovo are a prominent issue. Where the 
international level is concerned, the extent to which 
Kosovo will be regarded as a precedent – and even 
a model for conflict resolution – in other 
secessionist cases may be regarded as one its main 
costs. Overall, however, the second and third 
options are in line with the proportionality 
principle. To put the decision on hold (option 4) is 
mainly positive at the international level, but could 
have a negative impact in terms of its domestic 
consequences. The opposite is true for the fifth 
option– partial international recognition. 
The deadlock in the negotiations has led to mutual 
accusations. The main actors are accusing each 
other of seeking strategic advantage at odds with 
the security interests of the region and of the 
populations concerned. In terms of the just 
secession principles, they accuse each other of 
going against the principle of right intentions. But 
this criticism is open to challenge. Strategic 
interests do undoubtedly play a role, but they do 
not explain the difficulty in reaching agreement on 
common principles for resolving the question of 
just secession. In the case of great powers such as 
Russia or China, such interests remain subordinate 
to their view of the nation, and in particular to their 
fears of secessionist crises erupting on their own 
territory. For them, the very concept of a divided 
state has a different meaning than for the United 
States. Like Spain or Cyprus, Russia and China 
frame the problem of Kosovo in terms of their own 
national identity. It may be concluded that it is 
perhaps unfortunate that the search for geopolitical 
advantages not in line with the right intentions 
principle do not play a greater role in this conflict. 
That would make it easier to find a compromise.  
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Box 5. Five options and six principles of just secession in the Kosovo negotiations 
  Agreement 
between 
Serbia and 
Kosovo on 
autonomy 
Agreement 
between 
Serbia and 
Kosovo on 
independence 
UN SC 
decision on 
supervised 
independence 
Final 
decision on 
independence 
on hold 
Partial 
recognition 
1. Just cause  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2. Likelihood of success           
-  in implementing a just cause  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
-  as a strategy for achieving 
independence 
Not applicable  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
-  in building sustainable institutions  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
3. Last resort  Not applicable Not  applicable Yes  Yes  No 
4. Legitimate authority           
-  of the process for achieving 
independence 
Not applicable  Yes  Yes  Yes   No 
-  of the state institutions   No  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes 
5. Proportionality           
-  domestic No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
-  international   No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
6. Right intentions  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
 
 
Box 5 sums up the five options in the Kosovo 
negotiations. Each of them can be assessed 
according to the six just-secession principles. The 
application of the principles of just cause and last 
resort lead to the conclusion that Kosovo’s 
independence provides more solid guarantees of the 
prevention and correction of injustice than other 
forms of self-governance. This excludes option 1, 
autonomy. Of the four remaining options, which 
pave the way to independence, option 2 – namely, 
mutual agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on 
the creation of a new sovereign state – is fully in 
line with the just secession principles, with the 
exception of the principle of a reasonable chance of 
success.  
A UN SC resolution in favour of supervised 
independence for Kosovo (option 3) is in 
accordance with all six principles. If this choice 
does not materialise, option 4 – putting a decision 
on sovereignty and independence on hold – may be 
the most reasonable alternative, despite its 
significant moral costs, notably the risk of domestic 
instability. For this reason, this option is not in line 
with the likelihood of success principle when it 
refers to the sustainability of state institutions, or 
with the proportionality principle when it refers to 
consequences at the domestic level.  
Finally, option 5 – namely, division in the 
international community caused by partial 
recognition – does not appear to be justified. Such a 
unilateral act might be in line with the principle of 
likelihood of success, as far as the creation of an 
independent state is concerned, but it would not be 
in accordance with the principles of legitimate 
authority (in terms of the process of recognition) or 
proportionality (with respect to the costs and 
benefits at the international level). It would 
therefore make it more difficult in the future for the 
international community to agree on questions of 
international justice. 
5.  Outlook 
Kosovo’s future status would have to guarantee that 
the type of massive injustices suffered by the 
Albanian Kosovars under Serbian rule would not be 
repeated, and that the Kosovar minorities will not 
meet a similar fate. An internationally supervised 
form of independence meets this criterion. But the 
strong support by Western countries of this status 
option is not sufficient to guarantee its full 
international recognition. Partial recognition (by 
some but not all of the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council) may strengthen Kosovar state 
institutions on the domestic level, but would 
negatively affect their international legitimacy and 
their access to international institutions and support 
programmes. Putting the decision concerning the 
final status option on hold would to the contrary 
constitute a certain risk for domestic stability, but 
would remain in line with international law and with 
the principles applied by Western governments in 
other secessionist conflicts. A suspension of the  
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sovereignty question would more particularly have 
the advantage that it leaves the door open to further 
diplomatic negotiations, particularly within the UN 
Security Council. Confronted with this dilemma, 
Western governments may decide in function of 
pressing concerns over domestic stability in 
Kosovo, in the hope that the long-term effects of 
such a decision would not be detrimental to the 
resolution of secessionist conflicts elsewhere. The 
denial that Kosovo could constitute a universal 
model is based on such a hope. This would not be a 
wise choice, but even in such a case, Western 
governments have an interest in a managed and 
limited form of recognition of Kosovo’s 
international status, where some of the key issues of 
sovereignty and independence remain open for 
diplomatic negotiation.  